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This paper examines the potential for conflicts of interest in the debt 
ratings business. Inherent in the current business model is the fact that 
firms whose obligations are rated by the agencies pay fees for those 
ratings, which in turn comprises virtually all of the revenues of the rating 
agencies. Given the public nature of the ratings, no other business model 
seems feasible for rating agencies as commercial ventures, so that 
conflicts of interest are inherent in this important part of the financial 
markets infrastructure. This paper examines the nature of this conflict, how 
it is managed, and the significance of market structure and reputation in 
preventing conflict exploitation. These issues are linked to the use of 
ratings for regulatory certification purposes, as well as the international 
dimensions of debt ratings activity through investments and joint ventures 
of the major rating groups.. 
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Anytime advice is offered in a financial matter, there is a potential agency issue. 
The agent collects information, interprets it and disseminates it to principals who use the 
product of the agent's work in making financial decisions. This is true of stockbrokerage, 
asset management, private banking, equity research and a host of other retail and 
institutional financial advisory services. 
The agent is in business to maximize earnings. Revenues have to be generated 
from somewhere. The only case where potential agency problems (i.e., conflicts of interest 
between the agent and the client receiving the advice) do not occur is when the agent's 
sole source of revenue consists of fees paid by the client. In all other cases the potential for 
conflict of interest exists. Examples: 
$ A broker-dealer with a sales force compensated by commissions. 
 
$ An investment bank issuing research reports and recommendations that is itself 
involved in securities originations, merger and acquisitions advisory mandates and 
secondary market trading. 
 
$ An insurance company that sells "bundled" financial services such as variable 
annuities. 
 
$ An asset manager who is compensated by firms producing the assets that he or 
she sells to clients. 
 
                                                                 
1Stern School of Business, New York University. Draft of February 18, 2001. 
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Agencies that rate others for a fee clearly have a similar potential for conflict of 
interest. Such cases include publications that rate consumer products or vendors of 
financial services and while at the same time obtaining advertising revenues from those 
who are rated. Raters that refuse to have financial ties to the objects of their ratings B and 
therefore avoid even the appearance of conflicts of interest (such as Consumers Union) B 
are usually among the most highly regarded in the ratings business. 
Credit rating agencies likewise are subject to agency problems, since rating fees 
paid by issuers comprise their principal source of revenue. At the time of the industry's 
inception a hundred years ago with the publication of Moody's pioneering bond books, the 
issue did not exist as revenues came almost entirely from the sale of publications, and 
none came from fees paid by issuers. This situation changed later and became more of a 
problem with the growth in the importance of rated securities in the financial system and the 
insistence on ratings by institutional investors, their clients, and their regulators. Ratings 
also became particularly valuable in some of the least transparent instruments of the capital 
markets B notably foreign corporate or sovereign bonds, non-investment grade and 
emerging market debt, and ”structured@ financial products such as asset-backed 
securities. In such cases the rating agencies added a perspective not available from public 
sources B information gained from direct (often privileged) contact with the issuer=s 
management by experiences analysts who know which questions to ask. 
It is equally clear that a reputation for technical competence, continuity, 
transparency, objectivity and impartiality comprises the principal asset of the rating 
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agencies, without which there would be no justifiable demand for their ratings.2  
Consequently, this dependence on reputation has become the principal market-driven 
safeguard against exploitation of any potential conflicts of interest in the ratings business. 
And the fact that the two leading rating agencies, Standard & Poor=s and Moody=s, have 
between them an 80% share of the market for credit ratings also suggests that the 
marginal temptations to offer improved ratings for reduced fees (to get the ratings 
”mandate@) is unnecessary and totally out of proportion to the costs to the firm of serious 
damage to its reputation. 
The rating business has grown with the process of financial disintermediation, as 
bank debt has been replaced by securities issued in one financial market after another B a 
fundamental redirection of financial flows that generates significant gains for the end-users 
of the financial system. This transition has largely been completed in the United States, 
where it began more then twenty years ago, and is spreading now to other areas of the 
world, notably in the euro-zone, where capital markets are developing faster than most 
observers had anticipated. Such systemic changes in financial intermediation have made 
the rating business more attractive to investors in ratings firms and at the same time has 
created more competition for the market leaders, thus exposing them to temptations to 
exploit their businesses= inherent conflicts of interest in order to increase their profits or 
shore up their share prices.  
                                                                 
2Inferential evidence can be found in the reputational collapse of sell-side equity research conducted in firms 
active in corporate finance, which is widely regarded as strongly influenced by the need to generate advisory 
and transactions fees. 
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The paper examines the issue of conflicts of interest in the credit rating agency 
business. It addresses the role of rating agencies in the current financial system, how rating 
agencies achieve credibility, how they are compensated and price their services, and how 
they manage their agency and conflict-of-interest problems. It also considers the regulatory 
and litigation exposures with which agencies must learn to live in order to conduct their 
business, and how concerns about these exposures may be a compelling deterrent to 
misconduct. Some observers have complained that, despite such considerations, rating 
agencies remain essentially unregulated unlike all other institutions involved in debt 
issuance. Others insist that, despite the fact that “…rating agencies are a bit of a cozy club, 
effectively [the raters] are rated by the market, and if they started to lose credibility [the 
issuers] would stop paying for their services.@3  
 
 Financial Market Infrastructure: Where Rating Agencies Fit In 
                                                                 
3Steve Holmes of Fleming Asset Management  as quoted in Katherine Morton, ”Time to Face the Image 
Problem,@ Credit, April 2000. 
Useful trading information is often expensive. It has to be created, absorbed, 
processed and acted upon promptly to be applied effectively in the market. Sometimes 
gathering this information this is not a big problem. In the foreign exchange market, 
perhaps the most perfect in the world, dealers can check rates electronically with brokers 
and other dealers around the world on a 24-hour basis virtually year-round. All major 
players have almost the same information almost all the time, and also essentially the 
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same costs of doing transactions. So success or failure in this virtually seamless market 
depends mainly on the dealer=s interpretation of whatever information is available at the 
moment.  
In this context, credit rating agencies perform a valuable function by producing and 
assembling information which many investors in less transparent markets would find 
prohibitive to develop on their own. It may be shared with a large numbers of creditors, 
each of which typically has a relatively small stake in the borrowing entity. The information 
helps avoid both Type I and Type II errors in the lending process B i.e., extending credit that 
in retrospect should not have been extended, and not doing so when in retrospect credit 
should have been given. And the information is now widely available, especially in the age 
of the Internet, to all kinds of securities investors, both institutional and retail. 
Rating agencies maintain proprietary systems for transforming a host of quantitative 
and qualitative information into the ratings themselves. Their role can be two-fold B 
signaling and certification. Signaling involves new information or interpretation provided to 
the market, which influences how a particular debt issue gets placed B it lowers the cost of 
capital for the issuer and simultaneously improves portfolio efficiency for the investor. 
Certification involves the eligibility of a particular debt issue with regard to portfolio 
eligibility standards set by regulators, fund trustees, or boards of directors. 
Such information clearly has important public goods characteristics. Once it is 
released there is no way to prevent access to free riders. So, for example, banks that 
undertake expensive credit analysis would be reluctant to release it and encounter free-
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riding by other banks which have not made comparable investments B although in 
syndicated credits a bank may be able to recoup some of its costs in the front-end fees 
that typically are disproportionately distributed to lead managers of such transactions. The 
key to the economic viability in the ratings business is to reconcile the public-good nature 
of credit information with the need for the producers of that information to cover their costs 
and earn an appropriate return.  
Some rating agencies (e.g., A.M. Best and KMV) make their ratings available on a 
subscription basis and thus remain vulnerable to their clients= sharing this information B 
although there are both technical and legal ways of limiting the economic damage. Most 
other rating agencies publicly disclose their ratings and therefore cannot extract a fee from 
users B as do security firms who make their research available in return for “soft dollars@ 
associated with directed order flow and brokerage commissions. The only alternative is to 
charge the issuer for each rating. This represents a cost to the borrower that is shared with 
investors in that the costs are reflected in interest rates and/or fees. 
Issuers seeking a rating clearly benefit from that rating. Either they expect to receive 
a lower spread or they expect to access a broader investor pool (especially if regulators or 
fund trustees and directors require that certain rating parameters be met in order for a 
security to be qualified for a portfolio), or both. Those spread- and eligibility-effects are 
contingent on the perceived value of the rating, and hence drive the willingness to pay for it. 
Reputation is the key aspect of the ratings franchise, and is earned over a long history of 
rating a broad array of financial instruments in various geographic markets. The franchise 
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is difficult or impossible to duplicate in the short term, so that pricing ought to be 
susceptible to monopoly rents B although the existence of such rents is impossible to 
determine without insight into the pricing process or the size of any excess returns in the 
ratings business. 
The basic economics of the ratings business are thus based on the fact that it is 
impossible to charge for information once it has entered the public domain. This is 
amplified by exaggeration of the importance of ratings because of a general 
underinvestment in credit research, combined with pressure for rapid-decision-making on 
the part of individual issuers and investors. Its symptoms include understaffing and 
undercompensation in credit analysis, inexperience among credit analysts, and over-
reliance on credit agency research regurgitated on a  “quick and dirty@ basis as in-house 
research by financial intermediaries. 
Rating agencies, in short, play a key role in the infrastructure of the modern financial 
system. By reducing information costs, they dramatically enhance both static and dynamic 
market efficiency, the results of which are widely spread among financial intermediaries 
and end-users of the financial system. They therefore generate positive externalities and, in 
effect, constitute public goods whose benefits cannot be internalized by the agencies 
themselves due to the nature of rating production and distribution. The only “pressure 
point@ the agencies have (as the revenue basis for a viable business) is the ability to 
charge fees to issuers, thereby extracting what is arguably a small part of the economic 
rents accruing to the issuers and their shareholders. Rents from the availability of the 
ratings to investors remain uncompensated. The potential interest conflict facing rating 
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agencies is therefore unavoidable. The question is not whether such conflicts of interest 
exist. They do. Rather, what checks and balances are there which prevent the conflicts of 
interest from being exploited? 
The classic argument is that when such conflicts of interest exist, they will be 
exploited unless special steps are taken to make such exploitation impossible or 
unprofitable. The appearance of a major conflict of interest scandal involving the rating 
agencies could, by itself, compromise the value of that franchise B possibly fatally. 
Moreover, systematic conflict exploitation would over time show up though a higher 
incidence of credit problem situations and defaults in an environment where continuous 
comparisons of ratings by different providers are made by the media and by investors 
using the services of rating agencies.  
 
The Global Agencies B Coverage and Business Structure 
Exhibit 1 lists the principal global and regional credit rating agencies. The three 
global rating agencies B Moody=s, Standard & Poor=s and Fitch IBCA Duff & Phelps 
(“Fitch”) – form core of the industry. The international coverage of the major rating groups 
differs to some degree, with all three having substantial coverage in the US and Europe, 
but with Moody=s having a somewhat greater Asian coverage and S&P focusing 
somewhat more heavily on Latin America. Fitch (which now also includes Thompson 
BankWatch) has improved global coverage and on the whole has much of its relative 
competitive strength outside the US. Japanese raters (JCI, Mikuni and R&I) provide limited 
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global coverage. There is one global specialist covering the insurance sector, A.M. Best, 
one providing business credit information, Dun & Bradstreet, one providing global 
quantitative credit scoring services (KMV), and a variety of national or regional raters, 
notably in Japan, Sweden, Canada, Germany and Italy. These include Capital Intelligence, 
covering mainly peripheral markets in the Middle East, Asia and Eastern Europe. In 
addition, there are a number of local credit rating agencies in emerging market countries B 
see Exhibit 2.  
In addition to ratings of individual fixed income issues, the three major rating 
agencies have expanded their product lines. They now offer comprehensive “borrower 
ratings” which look at the financial strength of the issuer of debt as opposed to that of 
individual debt issues that are subject to specific provisions. Another product is bank loan 
ratings B including the effects of seniority, collateral, loan covenants and various other 
repayment protections -- which make it possible to compare recovery rates on impaired 
bank loans with bonds in default. There also are  “financial strength” ratings of banks, which 
includes an assessment of the operation of the governmental safety net B i.e., the stand-
alone credit risk associated with a given bank in the absence of the local safety net.  And 
there are  “sovereign ceilings,@ which address questions of country risk and notionally set 
the maximum rating  for all foreign-currency debt issues by borrowers from particular 
countries. 
The ownership of rating agencies varies substantially. Some, such as A.M. Best, 
Moody=s, Dun & Bradstreet, KMV and Mikuni, are independent, publicly-owned 
companies. Others like Standard & Poor=s and (formerly) Thomson BankWatch have 
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been part of publishing companies. Still others are owned by commercial banks, merchant 
banks and institutional investors, and in some cases are parts of industrial conglomerates. 
Especially in emerging markets, financial intermediaries are often among the owners of 
credit rating agencies, and international organizations B notably the International Finance 
Corporation B have taken an active role in getting agencies established as an important 
part of local financial market infrastructures. Below we profile the three global generalist 
raters -- Moody=s, Standard & Poor=s and Fitch. 
  
The New Moody=s Corporation 
In December 1999, the Dun & Bradstreet Corporation announced that, to improve 
overall shareholder value, it was going to split the company into two separate parts B a 
business information unit (the traditional D&B credit information and other businesses), 
and a credit ratings business (Moody=s), the shares of each of which would be traded in 
the market. On September 30, 2000 the share distribution took place. The two companies 
were separated, and Moody=s became, for the first time in its 100-year history, a publicly 
traded corporation reporting to the SEC.  
Moody=s only business is the publishing of credit ratings and the sale of certain 
investment advisory products. In June of 2000 Moody=s employed 1,500 people in 14 
countries and published ratings on approximately 100,000 corporate debt issues by about 
5,000 different issuers, plus 68,000 public finance obligations. Revenues amounted to 
$564 million in 1999, of which close to 90% were from ratings services. Of the rating 
    11    
revenues for the first quarter of 2000, 37% came from corporate ratings, 33% from 
structured finance ratings, 23% from financial institutions and sovereign ratings, and 7% 
from public finance ratings. About 40% of Moody=s ratings in 2000 were below investment 
grade. Of all Moody=s revenues for the first quarter 2000, 72% were derived from sources 
within the United States. Income before taxes in the first quarter 2000 was 61.5 million (a 
margin of 44.1%) and after taxes, $34.3 million (a margin of 24.6%).4 Moody=s stock was 
first traded at a market capitalization of approximately $4 billion, reflecting an 
approximately 25 times the firm=s price-earnings ratio.5 Thus the “ratings franchise value@ 
at Moody=s would appear to be relatively high in economic terms. 
Moody=s entire business is tied to publishing and updating rating analyses for 
various forms of debt obligations. Debt issuers believe that markets place a high value on 
a Moody=s rating, and are willing to pay a fee to Moody=s to obtain a rating. Moody=s 
also sells information and management tools to investors, and much of this information is 
based on its ratings analyses. The firm is registered as an investment advisor under the 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (not all rating agencies are so registered), and has been 
designated as a Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization (ANRSRO@) by the 
SEC. In 1997,  the SEC proposed regulations that would define the criteria requiring that 
applicant meet certain SEC monitored standards for granting NRSRO status.  Moody=s 
                                                                 
4Registration statement on Form 10 filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission by The New D&B 
Corporation, June 27, 2000.  
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ratings are used by a variety of institutional investors, financial services firms, and by 
banking and securities regulators to classify risk exposures. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
5The new D&B Corporation had a market capitalization of about $3 billion at the same time. 
Moody=s has a policy of charging a fee in advance for every rating that is requested 
of it. There is a standard fee schedule that reflects a volume discount for entities that have 
multiple issues outstanding. It occasionally will rate an issue that does not involve an 
issuer=s request for a rating as a service to the market, in which case it does not charge a 
fee. Sometimes, a rating applicant cancels its request for a rating after learning what the 
rating will be, in which case it will not be published. In most cases rating applicants obtain 
more than one rating, and are known to shop around for the best ratings. Moody=s 
competes principally with two large rating companies, Standard & Poor=s and Fitch, as 
well as with various non-US agencies and specialty firms. The firm is, however, clearly 
among the best known and highly regarded rating services, and as a result issuers often 
feel they must have a Moody=s rating to achieve the lowest possible cost of funds.   
 
Standard & Poor=s Corporation 
Standard & Poor=s Rating Services (AS&P@) was founded in 1916 and developed 
into the principal competitor to Moody=s as a supplier of credit information and risk 
analysis to investors in fixed-income securities. Initially, S&P ratings focused on 
conventional debt issues of corporations and general obligation bonds of states and 
municipalities. Later, S&P ratings encompassed the full range of credit-related products as 
they appeared in the market, including commercial paper, sovereign debt, mortgage- and 
    13    
asset-backed securities, loan-anticipation notes, project-finance debt, municipal revenue 
bonds and special agency issues, bond insurance, fixed-income and money market mutual 
funds, debt supported by letters of credit, as well as preferred stock. 
Standard & Poor=s was an independent company until 1966, when it was acquired 
by the McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., a publishing firm active in textbook publishing, media 
and information services. McGraw-Hill publishes Business Week, and a variety of trade 
publications, and provides Internet portals in aviation, construction and energy, healthcare 
information and broadcasting stations. 
Remarkably, McGraw-Hill has remained an independent firm in an industry that went 
through at least a half dozen waves of technological change and consolidation and that saw 
many of its competitors swallowed-up into media conglomerates like AOL Time Warner, 
Pearson PLC and News Corp.6 For the S&P business, this has (according to S&P itself) 
meant a relatively high degree of independence with two sets of “buffers” between the 
rating activity and the issuers B one between the Ratings Group and S&P itself, and the 
                                                                 
6
McGraw-Hill he firm was founded in 1909 by James H. McGraw and John A. Hill, who formed an alliance of 
their publishing companies by merging their book publishing businesses but keeping the remainder of their 
operations separate, each growing rapidly in part though acquisitions. Hill=s death in 1916 eventually led to 
a full merger of the two businesses into the McGraw-Hill Publishing Company in 1917. The company 
continued to grow and went public in 1929, the year in which Business Week  was first published. James 
McGraw=s son, James Jr. was CEO until 1950 and was succeeded by his brother, Curtis W. McGraw, 
under whom expansion continued beyond the firm=s traditional base in engineering and sciences into the 
social sciences, business and management, and from higher education textbooks into high school and 
elementary level educational publishing, a course continued under his brother Donald C. McGraw with 
numerous acquisitions in an array of publishing and business information areas. S&P was added in 1966. 
McGraw-Hill contributions in the securities area included the creation of the CUSIP numbering system to 
track securities in 1968. Following a series of further acquisitions in areas like broadcasting under CEO 
Shelton Fisher, Harold McGraw, grandson of the founder, took over the firm in 1974. He was succeeded by 
Joseph Dionne in 1988, marked by ventures into custom publishing, the Internet and a new corporate 
identity as the McGraw-Hill Companies, and succeeded in turn by Harold McGraw III, who had been with the 
firm since 1980. The firm is marked by a strong commitment to sustained independence and (arguably) the 
continuing influence of the McGraw family in the company's affairs.  
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other between the S&P corporate entity and its owner, the McGraw-Hill Companies. 
Although one might argue that true independence is tested by continually changing 
business pressures, there has never been any allegation that the parent company has 
made any effort to interfere in S&P ratings activities.7 S&P claims that it bases its ratings  
“on a rigorous, defined methodology and freely published criteria...@8  
At a time when other aspects of information provided to the financial services 
market infrastructure -- such as investment banking research9 and audits conducted by 
major CPA firms also engaged in consulting and investing in audit clients  -- have been 
subject to intense criticism, S&P and its parent make a major effort to maintain a 
convincingly independent profile.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
7S&P emphasizes in its publicity materials that it operates without government mandate and has no links 
whatsoever to any investment banking firm, bank or other type of financial intermediary, and does not 
engage in any type of trading or underwriting activities. “Our sole mission is to provide objective, insightful 
risk analysis and evaluation.” 
 
8Standard & Poor=s Website at http://www.standardandpoors.com/ratings/ 
 
9See for example Gretchen Morgenson, “How Did So Many Analysts Get It So Wrong?@ New York Times, 
December 31, 2000. 
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Fitch 
Long the weakest of the principal US rating agencies, Fitch Investors Service in 
1997 merged with the IBCA Group in London to  “put together two complementary 
companies that shared a dedication to analytical quality, openness in their reasoning, and 
first-rate client service@ in the form of Fitch IBCA.10 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
10Fitch IBCA Website at http://www.fitchibca.com/ 
Like Moody=s and S&P, Fitch has been a designated by the SEC as a Nationally 
Recognized Statistical Rating Organization since 1975. It has attempted with mixed 
success to encroach on the two major agencies= market shares with aggressive 
marketing in both the corporate and municipal bond areas, and particularly in structured 
finance. Some have argued that the presence of an aggressive third competitor has 
encouraged ratings-shopping among issuers and that Fitch has tended to have the 
Asoftest@ rating criteria B countered to some degree by dual-rating requirements imposed 
on issuers by the markets or by regulators. In 2000 Fitch acquired two additional rating 
agencies. The first was Duff & Phelps, a second-tier US rating agency with significant 
strengths in a relatively narrow range of issuers. The second was Thomson Financial 
BankWatch, an international rating agency concentrating on the financial services sector. 
Fitch is arguably Europe's leading rating agency, and has particularly emphasized its 
coverage of European corporate bonds B a market that has experienced substantial 
growth since the advent of the euro in 1999 B  along with its worldwide coverage of 
    16    
financial institutions and sovereign governments. Fitch employs over 600 analysts and staff 
in 21 offices worldwide. 
Fitch is owned by a French conglomerate, FIMALAC SA, that was founded in 1991 
when it divested its interests in several French real estate and media companies and 
redeployed the assets in the acquisition of Fitch IBCA and a variety of other businesses, 
including the world=s fourth largest storage company of chemical products, a manufacturer 
and distributor of office supplies and furniture, and providers of alloys derived from 
precious and non-precious metals. FIMALAC has 4,000 employees in some 30 countries 
located in Europe, North and South America, East Asia, Africa and Australia.  A French 
investor, Marc Ladreit de Lacharrière, indirectly owns 64% of the group=s total capital, with 
the remaining 36% held by the public and listed on the Paris Bourse. 
The ownership and control of Fitch is thus very different from both of its major 
competitors. It is non-US and non-publishing, with indirect linkages to industry.  
 
 International Activities and Joint Ventures 
Each of the three major rating agencies has pursued a strategy of globalization, in 
part to reflect the growing international integration of fixed-income markets among the 
OECD countries and in part to pick up new business in local markets, especially in 
developing countries. Their contribution in creating both global consistency and setting 
local standards for credit analysis is doubtless significant and has been actively promoted 
by multilateral agencies, notably the International Finance Corporation, part of the World 
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Bank Group. The multilateral institutions somewhat belatedly came to the realization that 
the functioning of local banking and capital markets makes a disproportionate contribution 
to economic growth, and began to redirect their focus toward those markets from dominant 
reliance on project financing. This includes viable bank regulation and supervision, efficient 
exchanges, clearance and settlement, security market supervision, etc. Clearly the 
presence of internationally recognized credit rating agencies fits well into such and 
program. Examples of local credit rating agencies in some of the emerging market 
countries are provided in Exhibit 1. 
In providing ratings and research covering over 150,000 debt obligations issued by 
corporations, financial institutions, governments and governmental entities in over 100 
countries, New York-based Moody=s maintains offices in London, Paris, Frankfurt, Madrid, 
Milan, Limassol (Cyprus), Tokyo, Singapore, Hong Kong, Sydney, Toronto, São Paulo, 
Mexico City, San Francisco and Dallas. The firm claims to be able to achieve consistency 
in rating standards through its direct presence in these financial markets. However, to 
achieve greater penetration of international markets, especially of the less transparent 
emerging financial markets that cannot justify a stand-alone presence B but where the 
contribution of rating agencies can be greater than in the more transparent major financial 
markets  B Moody=s has elected to establish alliances with leading local credit rating 
agencies. This includes Korea Investors Service (Korea); Dagong Global Credit Rating 
Co. (People=s Republic of China); ICRA Ltd. (India); Clasificadora de Riesgo Humphreys 
Limitada (Chile), and Humphreys Argentina S.A.(Argentina). These focus exclusively on 
ratings in the local-currency debt markets, and presumably leverage off Moody=s 
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reputation. How extensively Moody=s is able to monitor and control the professional 
standards and conduct of these alliances is not known. 
Standard and Poor=s has direct local ratings representation in Argentina, Australia, 
Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Spain, 
Singapore, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Like Moody=s, it has a number of local 
affiliates including ones in the Philippines, India, and Russia. Fitch has a direct local 
presence in Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Chile, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Mexico, 
Singapore, South Africa and the United Kingdom, as well as several affiliated companies 
such as Apoyo & Associados Internacionales SA (Lima), Classificadores S&S C.A. 
Sociedad Classificadora de Riesgo (Caracas) and CASE (Mumbai). 
It is clear that each of the three major rating agencies has made significant efforts to 
cement its position in the principal national financial markets and to transfer its approach to 
debt ratings into those markets. All of the principal local markets for fixed-income 
securities in the OECD countries are covered by a direct presence of at least two of the 
three major agencies, and all three in the case of the premier markets. There seems little 
doubt that the leveraging of the firms= reputational capital into these markets has 
substantial benefits in terms of market transparency and efficiency, and that these benefits 
are at least partly the product of sharp competition between them. However, much of this 
competition is conducted through distant branch offices or partly-owned affiliates over 
which the parent organizations may not have effective supervisory control. 
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 Competitive Structure and Pricing 
Though close to a duopoly (even in the presence of a third major contender), the 
credit rating business raises some interesting issues regarding the ability of smaller 
agencies to survive. It appears that most of these smaller rating agencies in fact obtain 
their revenues from subscribers, as shown in Exhibit 3, which is also true of such global 
specialists as A.M. Best and KMV.  Subscription-based raters generally use quantitative 
rating models and have no particular need for proprietary information from issuers. Their 
costs are sufficiently low to make a subscription-based business approach commercially 
viable. All of their ratings are therefore “unsolicited” and they play a very useful, 
complementary role in the financial market infrastructure with respect to the fee-based 
majors. 
The rating agencies are reluctant to discuss specific fees charged for ratings. One 
study estimates that S&P fees for public corporate debt issues ranged from $25,000 to 
more than $125,000 per issue, with the usual fee amount being 0.0325% of the face 
amount of the issue.11 Moody=s typical charges were understood in 2000 to be 
approximately 3-5bp on the issue amount, with a minimum of $25,000 and a maximum of 
$80,000 (except for complex issues where the charges could run considerably more), and 
some discounts are available for large, multiple issuers.   
In terms of sectoral distribution, U.S. banks contributed the largest share of rating 
agency revenues in the late 1990s, due to the large number of debt issues offered by the 
                                                                 
11William F. Treacy and Mark S. Carey, “Credit Risk Rating at Large US Banks,@ Federal Reserve Bulletin, 
Vol. 84, November 1998. 
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banks (fees were said to average over $100,000 per agency), followed by utilities and 
industrials (averaging between $25,000 and $100,000 per issue per agency per year).12 
As noted, there is substantial evidence that rating “shopping” has occurred from 
time to time, particularly at the critical break-point between investment-grade bonds and 
non-investment grade (“junk”) bonds, since many institutional investors are prohibited from 
investing in the latter. A Federal Reserve Bank of New York study in 1996 indicated that 
issuers often gained an investment-grade rating from a third agency if one of the two major 
agencies rated their bonds as non-investment grade.13 
Nevertheless, one study suggests that the existence of three competing rating 
agencies is in fact valued by the financial market. 14 Firms that obtain Fitch ratings tend to 
have higher Moody=s and S&P ratings than those that do not. They also tend to secure 
lower yields on debt issues, after controlling for their Moody=s and S&P ratings. The 
ratings are also likely to be more stable, and they are more likely to receive an upgrade 
from the other two agencies than firms that do not have a Fitch rating. And in cases of split 
ratings, Fitch tends to serve as a tie - breaker, an event that has had significant impact on 
bond yields. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
12Joseph Cantwell, “Managing Credit Ratings and Agency Relationships,@ Treasury Management 
Association Journal, November/December 1998. 
 
13Richard Cantor and Frank Packer, “The Credit Rating Industry,@ Journal of Fixed Income, December 1995. 
14Jeff Jewell and Miles Livingston, AA Comparison of Bond Ratings from Moody=s, S&P and Fitch IBCA,@ 
Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments,@ Vo. 8, No. 4, 1999. 
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A recent survey of 474 US industrial companies and 387 mutual funds that invest in 
publicly traded domestic debt securities assessed both investor groups= views of the three 
major rating agencies.15 The authors concluded that the two groups differ dramatically in 
their views of the agencies. Issuers think they need more ratings in order to ensure a “true” 
valuation in the marketplace, while institutional investors want fewer ratings to ease 
portfolio decision-making in the light of their own sophisticated internal credit analyses B 
i.e., using agency ratings only as additional inputs to internal evaluation and for 
“certification” purposes. Another finding is that both issuers and investors consider 
Moody=s and S&P ratings to be more accurate than Fitch=s, leading to a differentiation in 
their respective certification values. 
                                                                 
15 “How Do Bond Issuers and Investors View Credit Rating Agencies?@ No author. Working paper submitted 
for journal publication, 2000. 
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The major rating agencies are complemented in many financial markets by local 
rating agencies. There is a question whether their standards are up to the level of the 
majors, and whether they are equally capable of managing potential conflicts of interest. In 
some countries, local rating agencies are owned by financial institutions and other firms 
involved in the financial intermediation process that could compromise the agencies= 
objectivity. In some cases local agencies have been associated with the majors in joint 
ventures, which could help to alleviate this problem. And there is evidence that local 
knowledge brought to bear by local agencies in countries like Japan actually does add to 
the information used by investors to price securities.16 
Rating-shopping is a potential concern related to the industry=s competitive 
structure. Recall that rating-shopping occurs when issuers seek out raters that will take a 
more benign view of creditworthiness, or offer to lower ratings fees than their rivals, or 
participate in collusive arrangements between issuers and raters to skirt portfolio 
restrictions or regulatory criteria, or search for countries or market environments in which 
raters take a more favorable view of the issuer. However, research has found that the 
ratings of the two major agencies are very highly correlated, suggesting a general lack of 
outlier ratings that might be the result of exploitation of conflicts of interest. Nevertheless, 
there is evidence that Moody=s and S&P give lower ratings than the smaller agencies, and 
that this difference is systematic. On the other hand,  rank correlations between major and 
smaller agencies is very high, suggesting that their relative ratings are also very similar. In 
                                                                 
16Frank Packer, “Credit Risk in Japan=s Corporate Bond Market,@ Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 
Current Issues in Economics and Finance, Vol. 5, No. 15, November 1999. 
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short, there does not appear to be any prima facie evidence of conflict of interest 
exploitation in empirical studies of relative agency rankings.17 
Some observers have considered this a problem. For example Cantor and Packer 
note that “some agencies appear to have different absolute scales, rating bonds higher or 
lower on average than other agencies.@ And even normal variation of opinion across 
agencies with the same basic scales confounds the use of ratings for regulatory purposes 
or for setting portfolio constraints. These problems multiply as the number of agencies and 
the differences between them increase.18  
Another study, based on survey methodology, suggests a great deal of variation in 
how issuers and investors view the work of rating agencies. Issuers, for example, were 
found to favor multiple ratings in order to price issues more “accurately” (i.e., better for 
them), while investors generally favored one, or at most two, ratings from the dominant 
agencies B mainly in order to satisfy regulatory or certification requirements. The latter in 
many cases appear to rely primarily on sophisticated in-house buy-side analysis as 
opposed to the substantive content of agency ratings. Ratings from the two major agencies 
were universally favored on the presumption of higher-quality and more-consistent 
research, reinforcing the duopoly market structure, except in the case of split ratings.19 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
17Credit Ratings and Complementary Sources of Credit Quality Information (Basel: Bank for International 
Settlements, 2000).  
 
18Richard Cantor and Frank Packer, “The Credit Rating Industry,@ Journal of Fixed income, December 1994.
 
19NN, “How do Bond Issuers and Investors View Credit Rating Agencies?@ Unpublished  Working Paper 
(anonymous journal submission).
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A further consideration that limits monopoly power on the part of the rating agencies 
lies at the core of their business B human capital. The ratings business relies on a people 
who are carefully recruited, and who are then trained and gain experience in the complex 
rating process B including interactions with issuer management groups. These people 
soon find that their skills are quite portable. All of the rating agencies have long been 
considered prime territory for headhunters seeking analysts for investment banks and 
institutional investors. In many cases the agencies cannot compete with investment banks, 
for example, with respect to compensation, and focus their recruiting and retention 
arguments on job security, a reasonable lifestyle and steady, if gradual, promotion within 
the firm. Still, if people want to leave they will leave, and this diffuses the imbedded human 
capital and limits the potential for excess returns. 
All of this having been said, there is at least circumstantial evidence that the ratings 
business is a very good business to be in.20  Since S&P is part of a broad-gauge publisher 
whose divisional earnings are not publicly available, and since Fitch is privately held, only 
the new Moody=s Corporation shown any relatively “clean” evidence of profitability. For the 
year 2000, following the firm=s launch in the market, shares showed a total return of almost 
52% in a flat or declining market, trading in February 2001 at a P/E of 21.57 with a return 
on assets exceeding over 40%. In addition, the stock has been relatively stable (â = 0.80). 
Such impressive performance, if representative of the other two agencies, clearly reflects 
                                                                 
20See Lawrence White, "Industrial Organization of Global Rating Agency Business," paper presented at this 
conference. 
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the value of the franchise and, by inference, the magnitude of the damage that could be 
inflicted through exploitation of conflicts of interest. 
  
Ratings and the Regulators 
Ratings are used in prudential supervision in a large number of countries. Exhibit 1 
shows how credit ratings fit into the regulatory regimes of various developed and emerging 
markets countries. In a recent survey it was found that virtually all of the developed 
countries= banking regulators in one way or another used credit rating agency information 
in the financial regulation activities. 21 Of the 12 BIS Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision countries, 11 did so in 2000. To be certified by regulators B  for example, 
being designated an NRSRO in the US B  rating agencies must use techniques that are  
“rigorous, systematic, continuous and subject to some form of validation based on 
historical experience.@ They must also be independent and the methodology must be “as 
free as possible from any external political influence or constraints or economic pressures 
from assessed entities.@ 22 Four countries specifically note “credibility as a criterion for 
agencies whose ratings are used for supervisory purposes.  
It is useful to think of financial regulation and supervision as imposing a set of 
"taxes" or "subsidies" on the operations of financial firms exposed to them. On the one 
hand, the imposition of reserve requirements, capital adequacy rules, interest/usury 
                                                                 
21 Credit Ratings and Complementary Sources of Credit Quality Information (Basel: Bank for International 
Settlements, 2000).
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ceilings and certain forms of financial disclosure requirements can be viewed as imposing 
implicit "taxes" on a financial firm's activities in the sense that they increase costs.  On the 
other hand, regulator-supplied deposit insurance, lender-of-last resort facilities and 
institutional bailouts serve to stabilize financial markets and reduce the risk of systemic 
failure, thereby lowering the costs of financial intermediation. They can therefore be viewed 
as implicit "subsidies" provided by taxpayers.23 
The difference between these "tax" and "subsidy" elements of regulation can be 
viewed as the net regulatory burden (NRB) faced by financial firms in any given 
jurisdiction. Financial firms tend to migrate toward those financial environments where NRB 
is lowest C assuming all other economic factors are the same. NRB differences can 
induce firms to relocate where financial transactions are done as long as the savings 
realized exceed the transaction, communication, information and other economic costs of 
doing so. Since one can argue that, in today's global financial marketplace, transaction 
costs and other economic costs of relocating are likely to be small, one can expect 
financial market participants to be extremely sensitive to changes in current and perceived 
NRBs among competing regulatory environments. To some extent, the regulators 
responsible for particular jurisdictions appear to recognize this sensitivity and B in their 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
22 Ibid,  pp. 41-47.
 
23See Edward J. Kane, "Competitive Financial Reregulation: An International Perspective," in R. Portes and 
A. Swoboda (eds.), Threats to International Financial Stability (London: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
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competition for employment and value-added creation, taxes and other revenues B have 
engaged in a form of competition over NRB levels, a kind of "regulatory arbitrage."24 
Competition will spark a dynamic interplay between demanders and suppliers of 
financial services, as banks and securities firms seek to reduce their NRB and increase 
their profitability. If they can do so at low cost, they will actively seek product innovations 
and new avenues that avoid cumbersome and costly regulations. This may be easier when 
there are multiple and overlapping domestic regulatory bodies, as well as in the global 
case of multiple and often competing national regulatory authorities. 
A domestic financial system like the United States may have multiple regulatory 
authorities too, complemented by a host of other regulators at the state and local levels. 
For example, at the federal level financial activities could fall into the regulatory domain of 
the Federal Reserve Board, the Comptroller on the Currency, the SEC, and the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission, to name just the major regulatory agencies.  Each of the fifty 
states also has its own regulatory body to deal with banking, securities and insurance. 
Every city and municipality has an agency responsible for local income taxes, real estate 
taxes, transfer taxes, stamp duties, and so on, all of which affect the NRB bearing on 
financial firms. The situation is complicated still further by ambiguity regarding the definition 
of a "bank," a "security," a  “commodity,” an "exchange," and so forth C blurring the lines of 
                                                                 
24See Richard Levich and Ingo Walter, "Tax Driven Regulatory Drag: European Financial Centres in the 
1990s," in Horst Siebert (ed.) Reforming Capital Income Taxation (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 
1990).
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demarcation between both products and firms, and raising questions about which 
regulatory agency holds jurisdiction.25 
NRB associated with regulations in onshore financial markets creates opportunities 
to develop parallel, offshore markets for the delivery of similar services. Barriers such as 
political risk, minimum transaction size, secondary market liquidity, firm size and credit 
quality help temper the migration of financial activity abroad, although offshore markets can 
be used to replicate a variety of financial instruments such as forward contracts, short-term 
commercial paper, bonds, Eurocurrency interest rate futures, and the like C many of which 
are exposed to significant NRB by national financial authorities. These pose a general 
competitive threat to onshore securities or banking activities, although entry and exit costs, 
currency conversion costs, and distance-related delivery costs C plus uncertainties 
surrounding these costs and problems of management control C are effective barriers to 
complete NRB equalization across countries. 
                                                                 
25Edward Kane (op. cit) has argued that regulation itself may be thought of in a "market" context, with 
regulatory bodies established along geographic, product, or functional lines competing to extend their 
regulatory domains. Financial firms understand this regulatory competition and try to exploit it to enhance 
their market share or profitability, even as domestic regulators try to respond with reregulation in an effort to 
recover part of their regulatory domain.
 
The rise of regulatory competition and the existence of offshore markets thus 
underscores the fact that financial services firms often face a range of alternatives for 
executing transactions in any of several financial centers. The development of offshore 
currency and bond markets in the 1960s was a case where borrowers and lenders alike 
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found they could carry out the requisite market transactions more efficiently and with 
sufficient safety by operating offshore, in what amounted to a parallel market. Domestic 
regulators usually want to have the transactions conducted within their own financial centers 
C driven by their desire to maintain an adequate level of prudential regulation, sustain 
revenues from the taxation of financial services, support employment and output in the 
financial services industry and linked economic activities, or simply maximize their 
regulatory domain. And so the market for financial regulation is "contestable" in the sense 
that other national regulatory bodies or offshore opportunities offer (or threaten to offer) 
rules that may be more favorable than those of the domestic regulator. 
As any factor of production or economic activity gains mobility, it becomes 
increasingly difficult to subject it to unreasonable regulation. In today's world 
communications costs are low and capital mobility is high, so it is becoming less and less 
feasible for a state or a nation to impose an NRB that stands too far apart from world 
norms. Still, it is likely that a long-run equilibrium can be sustained with a positive overall 
NRB. Financial firms ought to value location in the midst of an important and orderly 
market, their access to financing by lenders of last resort, and the opportunity to be 
headquartered in a stable and secure political climate. Indeed, we observe that those 
markets that are almost totally unregulated, such as the Eurocurrency market (with NRB 
approaching zero), have not in fact completely dominated financial transactions subject to 
location-shifting. 
If financial institutions find it in their interest to pay some regulatory tax, the 
economic question then centers around the sustainable magnitude of this net regulatory 
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burden. It seems probable that the progressive convergence in regulation of banks, 
securities firms and other types of financial firms will continue. Players based in the more 
heavily regulated countries will successfully lobby for liberalization, and there will be an 
emergence among regulators of a broad-gauge consensus on minimum acceptable 
standards that will eventually be accepted by those countries with substandard regulatory 
regimes. The objective is to optimize the balance between market efficiency and regulatory 
soundness, so that market forces are free to become the main determinants of what 
transactions are carried out, where and by whom.  
The rating agencies are an integral part of implementing NRB at the national level to 
the extent that they are incorporated in the regulatory process. They clearly impose costs 
on financial intermediaries such as institutional investors by limiting investments to certified 
securities and possibly displacing portfolio allocations B costs that eventually are borne by 
individual investors. They also increase costs to issuers and in some cases may cause 
deviations from optimum capital structures. At the same time, they generate substantially 
lower information costs as a public good, especially in less transparent financial market, 
which lowers NRB. Rating agencies, in short, generate both burdens in the form of 
monetary and non-monetary costs as well as benefits in terms of reduced information and 
certification costs, and therefore may be an important factor in the NRB equation. 
An additional dimension comprises the BIS proposals to improve the  “granularity” 
of bank capital adequacy standards in comparison to the crude credit risk  “buckets” that 
have prevailed in recent years B along with their perverse effects in redirecting credit within 
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borrower classes. While the ultimate objective of the BIS proposals is to allow banks to use 
proprietary credit scoring models that, in turn, are themselves subject to regulatory vetting, 
one of the proposed options available to banks would be would be to use rating agencies= 
assessments (or those of national export credit agencies, or ECAs) as a basis for capital 
provisioning by banks. There is also the issue of mapping internal credit assessment onto 
the credit agencies= assessments. If adopted, the BIS proposals are likely to increase the 
demand for rating agencies= services, at least for a while, and further enhance their role in 
the financial market infrastructure. 
Historically, the major rating agencies have been against the use of credit ratings in 
the regulatory process due to potential impact of rating changes on financial markets, 
incentives to engage in ratings-shopping, the accuracy of ratings in reflecting the underlying 
risks, the use of ratings as “automatic pilot” substitutes for proper credit analysis by lenders 
and investors, and the pressure that might be brought to bear on the agencies if they were 
to become too closely tied to the regulatory process B including regulation of the agencies 
themselves. Their revenue streams would become increasingly driven by regulatory 
certification as the agencies= raison d=être, placing them on a slippery slope leading 
away from their historic mission of serving the information needs of private savers and 
investors. 
  
   
 Conflicts of Interest and Franchise Value  
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The previous sections of this paper have surveyed some of the principal structural 
elements of the global credit rating business and its use in a regulatory context within the 
framework of the net regulatory burden. We have also indicated the key potential for 
conflicts of interest that is inherent in the major agencies= almost exclusive reliance on 
fees paid by issuers, and the reasons for this based on the concept of public goods. The 
key issue is therefore whether exploitation of this inherent conflict is in fact a problem, and 
whether it is one that could bear negatively on the functioning of financial markets. 
Conflicts of interest can potentially occur at a number of “pressure points@ in the 
ratings process: 
· At the initial contact between the issuer and/or its investment bank in soliciting a 
rating. 
 
· In the application by the issuer of the agency=s rating model and assessment of an 
issue=s rating-sensitivity to changes in the structure of the offering and discussions 
with agency staff. 
 
· During meetings between the agency=s staff and corporate management of 
government officials and the assembly of both public and private information. 
 
· During the preparation of a recommendation to the rating committee, and during the 
committee meeting leading to the rating to be assigned. 
 
· During the comment period made available to the issuer between the preliminary 
assignment of a rating and its publication.  
 
· Following rating reviews which place an issuer on a Awatch list@ for possible re-
rating B usually negative, stable or positive B after there has been an unexpected 
material change in the issuer=s fundamentals and announcement that a rating 
review is in process.26 
 
                                                                 
26According to S&P, about two thirds of such actions lead to a subsequent rating change.
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 When an agency issues an unsolicited rating -- as S&P and Moody=s do in the 
case all taxable SEC-registered public issues in the US for which the issuer does not 
request a rating B based on public information and the issuer argues that the rating is 
based on a lack of material information. 
 In the case of sovereign ratings, which generally set a  “sovereign ceiling@ for other 
issuers domiciled in the country concerned, and the government or issuers brings pressure 
to bear on the agency that it is being too conservative B pressure that may be especially 
telling where the agency is focusing on the soundness of the domestic banking system or 
where it has a significant business or joint venture in the country. Since reputation is the 
major agencies= key asset, it seems likely that besmirching the reputations of competing 
agencies is sometimes too tempting to resist. There is little evidence of such activity 
among the two major agencies, although the smaller ones have from time to time raised 
reputation questions about the two dominant players.27 According to one spokesman, 
“We’ve been managing the issue of multiple constituencies for years. If we started inflating 
ratings to get business, it would become readily apparent to investors and our overall 
credibility as a rating agency serving the global credit markets would be at stake. We are 
constantly evaluating what we do and mindful of the investors we serve.”28 
 
A view critical of the “reputational capital@ or “franchise value@ concept of the 
conduct of rating agencies holds that reputation cannot be empirically linked to estimation 
                                                                 
27The Economist, idem.
 
28NN, AHow do Bond Issuers and Investors View Credit Rating Agencies?@ Unpublished  Working Paper 
(anonymous journal submission). 
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of credit spreads, the use of credit derivatives and the large number of ratings-driven 
transactions.29 The author suggests that a “regulatory license” view of the role of credit 
agencies B which attributes value mainly to enabling investors to meet certain regulatory 
constraints through the use of agencies B dominates, and suggests that regulatory 
constraints should be replaced by bond market traded credit spreads (which reflect all 
available information known to investors). If the “regulatory license”  view is correct, it would 
deprive the rating agencies of much of their value, at least in well-functioning markets. It 
also suggests that there is constraint on the exploitation of conflicts of interest by the rating 
agencies other than safeguarding reputation, namely credit spreads determined in the 
market. One safeguard thus is the market itself.  
As a public company Moody=s, for example, is subject to the requirement to report 
all material information concerning its business, including all of its operating and financial 
information, periodically. It is subject to regulatory and legal penalties for failing to report 
this required information accurately. As a registered NRSRO and Investment Advisor, its 
rating activities and professional conduct are subject to SEC review and sanctions. 
Ultimately the rating agencies enjoy de facto certification by the principal securities 
regulators, such as the SEC in the United States and the FSA in the United Kingdom, at 
least until something disturbs prevailing conditions. An SEC complaint or disciplinary 
action or the withdrawal of a certification could result in severe damage to the future ability 
of a rating agency to attract business. Most businesses are not scrutinized anywhere near 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
29Frank Partnoy, “The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets: Two Thumbs Down for the Credit Rating 
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as closely as are rating agencies, nor they are as potentially subject to loss of shareholder 
value in the case of management failure or misconduct.  
Second, and closely linked to regulatory and legal sanctions, are market penalties. 
Violations of legal or professional standards in conducting its rating business can make all 
outstanding ratings suspect, and destroy the perceived value of having a rating from the 
agency that granted it. Such conduct would appear to have disproportionately serious 
consequences on the future business and market value of the company. This concern 
should be reflected in management practices such as compensation policies. Moody=s (in 
an interview with the authors) reported than its compensation policy for rating personnel 
was not to tie compensation or performance evaluation to the revenue stream of the 
business in any way.30 Thus a potential moral hazard in which ratings could be overstated, 
or manipulated in return for higher compensation to the staff involved would appear to be 
precluded.  
It its SEC filing, Moody=s lists among the serious risks related to its business the 
fact that its  “success depends on its ability to maintain its professional reputation and 
brand name.@ It depends on its reputation, it says, “in order to secure new engagements 
and hire qualified professionals.@ Further, it adds, “any event that hurts Moody=s reputation 
B including poor performance or errors in ratings (whether real or perceived) B may 
negatively impact Moody=s ability to compete.@ Indeed, in one hundred years in the ratings 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Agencies,@ Washington University Law Quarterly, Vol. 77, No. 3 (1999).
 
30Interview with Moody=s employees Jerome S. Fons, Managing Director, and Richard Cantor, Vice 
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business, Moody=s has not suffered any such major loss of economic value as a result of 
ratings misconduct, and it has probably learned how to manage the natural conflicts and 
temptations of the business, although as long as it is possible to fudge a rating, the 
company must remain vigilant. Reputation effects can be especially relevant in markets 
where there is imperfect information, as is the case with ratings.31 
Third, in addition to the rating agencies= certification and franchise value, 
exploitation of conflicts of interest also tends to be constrained by their vulnerability civil 
lawsuits. For example, a 1983 default by the Washington Public Power Supply System, the 
1991 default by Executive Life and the 1997 default by Orange County, California ass 
triggered legal actions against the rating agencies. Given the extremely litigious 
environment in the United States and the ability to bring civil actions in US courts in the 
event of problems incurred elsewhere in the world. 
 
 The Issue of Unsolicited Ratings 
One nagging question is whether an issuer that is subject to an unsolicited rating of 
one of its issues is driven to negotiate a solicited rating in return for a fee and the hope that 
such a rating will be more favorable. However, in most unsolicited ratings the issuer does 
in fact participate. According to Moody=s, “a misperception has persisted that our 
unsolicited ratings are assigned without the benefit of issuer participation, whereas in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
President, July 2000. 
 
31David M. Kreps and Robert Wilson,  “Reputation and Imperfect Information,@ Journal of Economic 
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vast majority of cases issuers have in fact participated in the rating process.@32 Moody=s 
designates each unsolicited rating as such in the respective press release. S&P issues pi 
(relying on an issuer=s public information and other information in the public domain) 
ratings, which are not based on confidential corporate information supplied by the issuer=s 
management and are reviewed each year based on new financial information. Or they may 
be triggered by a material event affecting the issuer=s credit standing. S&P=s pi ratings 
are not subject to shading or re-rating watch lists. 
In 1996 the US Department of Justice initiated an investigation into a possible 
breach of antitrust laws in connection with the conduct of in the rating agency business. The 
principal focus was Moody=s use of unsolicited, or  “hostile” ratings, which occur when an 
agency rates a bond issue even though it has not been explicitly mandated or paid to do so 
by the issuer. Moody=s defense was that it owed an obligation to investors as well as 
issuers, and was protected under free speech in notifying the public of its views, particularly 
when the firm considered competitors= ratings to be wrong. However, in a legal action 
against Moody=s in October 1995 the Jefferson County School District in Colorado 
accused the firm of “fraud, malice and wonton conduct@ in issuing a “punishment” rating of 
the District=s bonds after it had failed to hire the agency to rate them. Moody=s was also 
shown to have invoiced issuers of bonds subject to unsolicited ratings after the fact, with 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Theory,@ Vol. 27, August 1982.
 
32 “Designation of Unsolicited Ratings in Which the Issuer Has Not Participated,@ Moody=s press release, 
November 1999.
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accompanying letters that appealed to wavering companies to A...reflect on the propriety of 
failing to pay for the substantial benefits that the issuer reaps from our efforts.@33 
Moody=s, in response said, “a rating is always solicited, as it is either requested by 
the issuer or investor, in most cases by both constituents. When Moody=s initiates 
unsolicited ratings, we always invite management to participate, a fact that has often been 
misperceived.@34 Moody=s goes on to argue that unsolicited ratings are sometimes 
initiated where credit risk appears to be misunderstood or mispriced in the market or 
where the issuer is involved in a cross-border transaction into a market that has grown to 
rely on credit ratings B but that in all cases the firm aims at global consistency in its rating 
practices.  
For its part, Standard and Poor=s does not do unsolicited ratings B given the 
absence of management cooperation B  although it does issue its public information (pi) 
ratings for emerging market banks and European insurance companies, for example, 
where there is strong investor demand. It also provides pi ratings of bond issues in the US 
capital market where SEC disclosure requirements are felt to be sufficient to obviate the 
need for management cooperation. Critics have argued that unsolicited and pi ratings are 
basically the same thing, with the same underlying motivation on the part of the rating 
agencies.  
                                                                 
33As quoted in  “Credit Rating Agencies,@ The Economist, April 6, 1996, p. 56.
 
34Chester Murray, Managing Director, Moody=s Europe as quoted in Katherine Morton, ”Time to Face the 
Image Problem,@ Credit, April 2000.
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The element of compulsion certainly exists in a firm=s response to an unsolicited 
rating “thrown over the wall.@ It can choose to cooperate and provide information to 
improve the accuracy and completeness of the basis for the rating, which would tend to 
improve market information whether or not the firm eventually pays for the rating. One 
apparent intent underlying unsolicited ratings is to prevent rating shopping or to respond to 
investor requests, although the Moody=s allegations cast some doubt on at least part of 
this motivation. On the other hand, it is likely that some additional information or analysis 
does reach the market in this way B although the fact that they are based solely on publicly 
available information may on average imply a negative or conservative bias associated 
with such ratings. 
Sometimes the use of unsolicited ratings has an impact on how the rating agencies 
themselves are rated. A recent study of the Japanese rating environment, for example, 
found that the two local rating agencies, Japan Credit Ratings and R&I provided higher-
quality ratings than Standard & Poor=s and Moody=s, a result the authors ascribe to the 
use of unsolicited or indicative ratings by the two majors B which in turn suggests that the 
indigenous agencies can be more easily manipulated.35  This raises the possibility that 
unsolicited ratings can actually mitigate conflicts of interest, rather than exacerbating them. 
 
 
 
                                                                 
35Joseph Cantwell,  “Managing Credit Ratings and Agency Relationships,” Treasury Management 
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The Problem of Local Involvements 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Association Journal, November/December 1998. 
Whereas the aforementioned legal, regulatory and market sanctions may well prove 
effective in the rating agencies= businesses in the world=s major financial centers, the 
same may not be true in secondary and emerging financial markets. Local markets are 
subject to political and business pressures that are sometimes very different from those in 
the key Anglo-American markets, for example, where all three of the global rating agencies 
are based. So there is always the question of conflicts of interest arising in such markets. 
Although these are likely to be limited to the local markets themselves, they always run the 
risk of more broadly contaminating the firms= global franchises.  
In early 2000 controversy erupted over the major rating agencies= respective 
assessment of Mexico=s economic prospects. It was alleged that the respective 
competitive positions of S&P and Moody=s in the Mexican ratings business could perhaps 
explain their very different assessments of the country=s debt service prospects. Moody=s 
had put the country=s long-term foreign currency debt under review for a possible upgrade 
from junk to investment grade status, citing Mexico=s improving debt service burden and 
reflecting analysts= perceptions of reduced risk. Standard & Poor=s rated Mexico=s long-
term foreign currency debt as non-investment grade, one notch below Moody=s, and 
indicated that it would not be considering an upgrade until after the Presidential elections in 
July 2000 B Mexican presidential elections have frequently coincided with substantial 
economic and financial turmoil and policy changes.  
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Moody=s announcement was widely praised by the Mexican government and 
sparked a rally in local bond and equity markets, bolstering Moody=s chances of winning 
mandates for a long queue of government entities and corporates planning to issue bonds 
in the ensuing months. Moody=s denied that its aggressive selling effort had anything to do 
with the unexpected upgrade six moths before the Presidential election, citing the primacy 
of reputation and credibility as the firm=s key selling tool.36 Some observers noted that in 
the presidential elections six years earlier, in 1994, it was S&P that was bullish on the 
country and Moody=s was more cautious, coinciding at that time with a strong marketing 
effort in the country by S&P. Late 1994 saw a large and poorly-handled Mexican 
devaluation followed by a financial crisis and massive international bailout early in 1995, 
events not anticipated in either rating agency=s assessment at the time. 
The rating agencies have not been alone in feeling the pressure of governments in 
response to their assessments. In February 1999 Goldman Sachs analysts targeted the 
financial condition of Thailand=s largest bank, Bangkok Bank, as a potential threat to the 
country=s financial stability, driving down the price of its shares. The Thai Ministry of 
Finance immediately chastised Goldman Sachs and implicitly threatened to withdraw 
government business, which in turn was coupled to the threat of lost private-sector 
business from companies hesitant to incur the disfavor of the Ministry of Finance. Goldman 
Sachs hastened to apologize and make amends (but it did not withdraw its analysis).  
                                                                 
36Jonathan Friedland and Pamela Druckerman, ”Moody’s, S&P Are at Odds Over Future of Mexico,@ Wall 
Street Journal, February 7, 2000.
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In the same vein, commentators noted that Morgan Stanley had been dismissed in 
1997 as financial adviser to Shandong International Power Development in China after 
publishing a negative research report and that retribution in the case of unfavorable 
research was hardly unusual in Asia, where links between government, private companies 
and powerful families are much closer than in some other parts of the world.37 
                                                                 
37Mark Landler, “Investment Banks Must Soothe Asian Sensibilities,@ New York Times , March 12, 1999.
 
The issue of loss of control of reputational capital may be more problematic in the 
case of the joint ratings ventures that each of the three agencies have created, mainly in 
peripheral markets in developing countries. The strategic objective appears to be to fill-in 
their presence in non-OECD financial markets, especially those with promising local bond 
markets. Both S&P and Moody=s have focused their joint ventures in the major emerging 
markets, some of which have the potential for further integration into the global capital 
markets. Fitch IBCA seems to be concentrating its joint ventures on truly peripheral 
emerging markets in North Africa, Pakistan, etc., in some cases in concert with the 
International Finance Corporation whose mandate includes the development of viable 
indigenous financial markets. It seems clear that the rating agencies can be a very 
constructive component of the financial market infrastructure in such countries, although 
their minority positions in these joint ventures expose them to agency conflicts under stress 
conditions. 
 
Conclusions 
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This paper has considered key dimensions of the global credit rating business in 
the context of the potential for exploitation of conflicts of interest. We conclude that: 
1. The credit rating business is a major contributor to financial market efficiency, 
bringing about important reductions in information costs and improving both static (capital 
allocation) and dynamic (continued capital redeployment in the face of new information) 
market properties. 
2. The basic linkage between rating agency activities and systemic benefits is the 
production of positive externalities in the form of unpriced public information whose value 
cannot be easily captured by the agencies themselves but which often provides the basis 
for returns by the market=s intermediaries and end-users. Public policy plays an important 
role by virtue of its certification of agencies for various regulatory purposes. In a net 
regulatory burden context, the positive external effects of the rating process go a long way 
toward reducing NRB, arguably contributing to the fact that the most competitive global 
financial centers are those where the rating agencies are most intensively engaged. 
3. The highly concentrated and transparent nature of the ratings business and 
barriers to entry facing new competitors B including regulatory and certification issues B 
creates an overriding concern with preserving franchise value on the part of owners which, 
in itself, provides the key safeguard against exploitation of conflicts of interest in the 
agencies= business model, i.e., one forced to rely on issuer fees. Vulnerability of the 
franchise is bolstered by the prospect of regulatory decertification and legal action against 
the agencies. 
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4. In the light of what appears to be a highly profitable business the credit rating 
agencies appear to have gone to great lengths to ensure that reputation losses are 
avoided. This includes the ownership of the agencies themselves which B certainly in the 
case of Moody=s and S&P B are aware of the concentration of value in the reputation of 
the franchise, and are willing and able to insulate the rating business from other pressures 
to maximize earnings at the expense of issuing inaccurate ratings.  It also includes internal 
operating procedures and compensation policies, which appear to be carefully designed 
and policed to avoid conflict. Creation of not-for-profit of government-based rating 
agencies in order to provide an additional safeguard against exploitation of conflicts of 
interest does not appear to be necessary to protect issuers or investors against the 
agencies= potential conflicts of interest. 
5. All of the major rating agencies are actively involved in financial markets where 
some of the aforementioned safeguards may be hard to maintain, especially in the case of 
difficult to analyze markets and joint ventures with direct or indirect market participants. The 
consequences of misconduct in an under-controlled area (along the line of a Barings 
Brothers Singapore experience) could be serious, and could result in damage to a firm=s 
reputation. But a greater risk to reputation might be in erring (or mishandling an error once 
made) in a large but risky market, such as Russia, where extremely competent and unusual 
expertise would be necessary to achieve an accurate rating. If such a rating turned out to 
be inaccurate and seriously misleading to investors, and the securities failed, the agencies 
could be blamed and discredited (or worse). 
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For a long time the major credit rating agencies have preserved a reputation for 
honesty, and professional conduct in providing bond ratings. They have made mistakes in 
the past, but they have never been scandalized or suffered a significant franchise value 
loss as a result of misconduct. In recent years however, there has been dramatic growth in 
the demand for ratings B especially ratings of highly complex securities and non-investment 
grade securities issued by countries and corporations in difficult to manage areas of the 
world. This increasing demand has attracted a new array of competitors for the principal 
two rating agencies, and the new competitors are eager to increase their market shares. 
Meanwhile, institutional investors are becoming increasingly sophisticated about bond 
analysis, and may be less reliant on credit ratings than they were a number of years ago. 
Competition will inevitably increase in the years ahead, and this competition may tempt the 
agencies to protect their earnings and market share positions by activities that might be 
construed as exploitative of inherent conflicts of interest. The regulators that certify them as 
national credit rating agencies (as do the stockholders of the agencies themselves, whose 
investments are at stake) need to be especially vigilant in the years ahead.  
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Exhibit 1 
Global and Regional Rating Agencies: Size Ownership, and Geographic Distribution of  
Ratings Assigned 
 
Rating Agency Employees Ratings Assigned Ownership Geo Dist of 
Ratings 
Global/Regional 
 
A.M. Best Co. 
 
 
Bonniers Kreditfakta I Norden AB 
Canadian Bond Rating Service 
Credit Safe AB 
Dominion Bond Rating Service 
Dun & Bradstreet 
Egan-Jones Credit Rating Co. 
Euro Ratings AG 
 
Instantia Creditsystem AB 
International 
 
Italrating DCR SpA 
 
Japan Credit Rating Agency, 
Ltd(JCR) 
 
Japan Rating and Investment 
Information, Inc. (R&I) 
KMV Corporation 
Lace Financial Corp. 
 
 
Mikuni & Co. 
Moody’s Investors Service 
 
Neufeld’s Credit Information AB 
R&S Rating Services AG 
> 400 analysts, 
statisticians, and 
editorial pers.  
20 
35 
21 
30 
11,000 
 
7 analysts 
 
5 
 
 
 
 
74 
 
 
140 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1,500 
 
2 
8 analysts 
5,400 
 
 
All companies (780,000) 
> 500 corporate and public issuers 
690,000 out of 770,000 (in Sweden) 
> 500 corporate and gov. issuers 
Database of 53m companies 
2,000 companies 
 
 
All companies (780,000) via KreditFakta 
Databases 
 
53 
 
600 
 
 
1,100 
 
25,000 firms 
1,000 largest US banks; 250 foreign 
banks; 2,500 largest US credit unions; 
35 largest title insurance companies 
4,000 issues,  1,600 firms 
> 9,000 
 
A few companies 
Independent 
 
 
The Bonnier Group 
Private 
Norwegian company 
Private 
Independent 
 
Independent shareholders 
 
Private (the Köster family) 
 
 
One Italian investment bank (50% of 
the Capital) and Duff & Phelps (15%)  
Leading institutional investors, 
including major insurance companies 
and banks 
Nikkei Newspaper 
 
Independent 
 
 
 
Independent 
Dun & Bradstreet 
 
Private (Robert Neufeld) 
Independent, major shareholder 
Bavarian employer’s association 
65 countries 
 
 
Sweden 
 
Sweden 
 
230 countries 
US 
Germany 
 
Sweden 
 
 
Italy 
 
 
35 countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Japan 
70 countries 
 
Sweden 
Germany 
Global 
 
 
Regional (Sweden) 
Regional(Canada) 
Regional (Sweden) 
Regional (Canada) 
Global 
Regional (US) 
Regional (Germany 
and Austria) 
Regional (Sweden) 
 
 
Regional (Italy) 
 
 
Global 
 
Global 
 
Global 
 
 
 
Regional (Japan) 
Global 
 
Regional (Sweden) 
Regional 
(Germany) 
Source:  Bank for International Settlements,  Credit Ratings and Complementary Sources of Credit Quality Information  (Basel: BIS, 2000) 
 
Continued next page. 
 
 
Exhibit 1 (Continued) 
 
Rating Agency Employees Ratings Assigned Ownership Geo Dist of 
Ratings 
Global/Regional 
 
Standard & Poor’s 
 
SVEA Kredit-Information AB 
 
SVEFO Svergie AB 
 
Thomson Financial Bankwatch 
Unternehmensratingagentur AG  
Upplysningscentralen AB (UC AB) 
 
Merged agencies 
 
Duff & Phelps Credit Rating Co 
 
 
 
 
Fitch IBCA 
Fitch (2000) 
 
 
 
 
 
Outside G10 
 
Rating Agency Malaysia Berhad  
 
 
 
 
Capital Intelligence 
1,000 analysts 
 
3 
 
30 
 
69 analysts 
12 analysts 
160 
 
 
 
>600 empl. 
 
 
 
 
400 analysts 
1,100 
employees 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11 analysts 
3,478 global corporate issuers (1997); 
2,614 US corporate issuers (1997) 
All companies (780,000) via KreditFakta 
Databases 
All companies (780,000) via DreditFakta 
Databases 
>1,000 (650 issuers, 400 issues) 
 
All companies (780,000) 
 
 
 
68% of Latin American debt issues, 
64% Chile, 77% Costa Rica, 45% 
Mexico, 75% Peru, 100% Colombia, 
70% Venezuela  
 
10,163 global issuers; 9,033 US issuers 
1,600 financial institutions, over 800 
corporates and 700 insurance 
companies, 67 sovereigns, 3,300 
structured financings and 17,000 
municipal bonds ratings (US tax-exempt 
market) 
 
 
>400 banks 
McGraw-Hill (publishing and media) 
 
Private (Lennart Agren) 
 
Telia AB (largest phone company) 
 
Thomson Corporation 
Independent 
4 largest private Swedish banks 
 
 
 
Independent 
 
 
 
 
FIMALAC (French conglomerate) 
FIMALAC (French conglomerate) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Owned by commercial, merchant 
banks, 
Finance companies, Asian 
Development 
Bank, Fitch IBCA 
 
Independent 
>70 countries 
 
Sweden 
 
Sweden 
 
85 countries 
Germany 
Sweden &  
Norway 
 
 
>50 countries 
 
 
 
 
70 countries 
75 countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
37 countries 
Global (22 offices) 
 
Regional (Sweden) 
 
Regional (Sweden) 
 
Global (6 offices) 
Regional 
(Germany) 
Regional (Sweden,  
Norway) 
 
Global 
 
 
 
 
Global (29 offices) 
Global (40 offices) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Regional 
 
 
Notes 
1. Ratings assigned may be either to issuers or to issues. (Further work is needed to consider how multiple issue ratings might be brought together to give 
a representative issuer rating.) 
Exhibit 2 
Local Credit Rating Agencies 
Country Name Ownership Name Ownership Type Instruments Rated 
Argentina 
 
 
 
 
Brazil 
 
Chile 
 
 
 
 
Colombia 
 
India 
 
 
 
 
Israel 
 
Korea 
 
 
 
 
Malaysia 
 
Mexico 
 
 
 
 
DCR Argentina 
Fitch IBCA Argentina S.A. 
Standard & Poor’s Argentina Branch 
VALUE Calificadora de Riesgo S.A. 
 
SR Rating/Duff & Phelps 
 
Fitch IBCA Chile 
Duff & Phelps de Chile Ltda. 
 
Feller Rate-Clasificadora de Riesgo Ltda 
 
Duff & Phelps de Colombia S.A. 
 
Duff & Phelps Credit Rating India Private Ltd.  
Credit Analysis & Research Ltd. (CARE) 
The Credit Rating Information Services of India Ltd (CRISIL) 
 ICRA Ltd. 
 
MAALOT-The Israel Securities Rating Ltd.  
 
Korea Investors Service Co. 
Korea Management Consulting & Credit Rating Corporation 
National Information & Credit Evaluation, Inc. 
 
 
Rating Agency Malaysia  
 
Fitch IBCA Mexico S.A. de CV 
Duff & Phelps de Mexico, Sa de CV (DCRMEX) 
Standard & Poor’s SA de CV S&P Ca-Val 
DCR Argentina 
Fitch IBCA 
Standard & Poor’s 
Argenhold SA (80%) 
 
 
 
Fitch IBCA 
ECONSULT Credit  Rating  Ltd.  
 
Feller Rate 
 
Duff & Phelps 
 
Duff & Phelps 
Credit Analysis & Research Ltd (CARE) 
CRISIL 
ICRA Ltd. 
 
MAALOT 
 
Korea Investors Service 
Korea Development Bank (93%) 
National Information & Credit  
Evaluation, Inc. 
 
Rating Agency Malaysia Berhad 
 
Fitch IBCA 
Duff & Phelps de Mexico, SA de CV 
(DCRMEX) Standard & Poor’s 
 
Joint venture (Duff & Phelps)  
Subsidiary 
Subsidiary 
Local 
 
 
 
Subsidiary 
Joint venture (Duff & Phelps)  
 
Local (Strategic alliance with S&P) 
 
Subsidiary 
 
Subsidiary 
Local 
Local 
Local 
 
Local 
 
Local 
Local (Subsidiary of KDB) 
Local 
 
 
Joint venture (Duff & Phelps)  
 
Subsidiary 
Joint venture (Duff & Phelps)  
Subsidiary 
Bond and stock 
Bonds, stock,preferred, securitization , and bank  deposit  
Bonds 
Bonds,stock,securitization,and certificates of deposit  
 
Bonds 
 
Bonds and stock 
Debt instruments,stocks,commercial papers,and 
certificates of deposit  
Bonds,stock,and time deposits 
 
Bonds 
 
Bonds 
Bonds and time deposits 
Bonds,commercialpaper, and structured obligations 
Bonds and commercial paper 
 
Bonds 
 
Bonds and commercial paper 
Bonds and commercial paper 
Bonds and commercial paper 
 
 
Bonds and preferred stock 
 
Bonds 
Bonds and securitization 
Bonds 
 
Continues on next page. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 2 cont’d.... 
 
Country Name Ownership Name Ownership Type Instruments Rated 
Pakistan 
 
 
 
Peru 
 
 
 
 
Philippines 
 
Portugal 
 
South Africa 
 
 
Thailand 
 
 
Tunisia 
 
Venezuela 
DCR-VIS Credit Rating Company Limited 
The Pakistan Credit Rating Agency (Pvt) ltd. 
(PACRA) 
 
Duff & Phelps del Peru S.A. 
Apoyo and Asociados Internatinal S.A. 
Equilibrium Bank Watch 
Class and Asociados S.A. 
 
Credit Information Bureau, Inc. 
 
Companhia Portuguesa de Rating S.A. 
 
CA-Ratings 
Fitch IBCA South Africa (Pty) Ltd.  
 
Thai Rating & Information Services Company Ltd.  
 
 
Maghreb Rating 
 
Duff & Phelps de Venezuela, S.A. 
DCR-VIS 
PACRA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Credit Information Bureau, Inc. 
 
Sociedade de Avaliacao de Empresas e Risco, Lda 
 
CA-Rating 
Fitch IBCA 
 
Thai Rating & Information Services Company 
 
 
Inter Arab Rating Company 
 
A qualified group of local professionals 
 
Local 
Joint venture (Fitch IBCA) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Local 
 
Local 
 
Local 
Subsidiary 
 
Local (3-year Strategic Partnership 
with Fitch IBCA) 
 
Joint venture (Fitch IBCA) 
 
Joint venture (Duff & Phelps)  
Bonds and Stocks 
Bonds 
 
 
Bonds,preferred stock,and time deposits 
Banks,financial institutuions, bonds,share,stocks,all debt instru 
Banks,financial institutions, bonds, share,stocks, all debt instru 
Banks,financial institutions, bonds,shares,stocks, all debt instru 
 
Bonds and commercial paper 
 
Bonds and commercial paper 
 
Bonds 
Bonds 
 
Bonds 
 
 
Bonds 
 
Bonds 
 
 
 
Source: Financial Times, 1998 
Exhibit 3 
 
Market Practices of Rating Agencies 
 
Rating Agency Payment By Unsolicited Ratings 
A.B. Best Co. 
Bonniers Kreditfakta I Norden AB 
Canadian Bond Rating Service 
Credit Safe AB 
Dominion Bond Rating Service 
Dun & Bradstreet 
Egan-Jones Credit rating Co. 
Euro Ratings AG 
Instantia Creditsystem AB International 
Italrating DCR SpA 
Japan Credit Rating Agency, Ltd (JCR) 
Japan Rating and Investment Information, Inc. (R&I) 
KMV Corporation 
Lace Financial Corp. 
Mikuni & Co. 
Moody’s Investors Service 
Neufeld’s Credit Informatin AB 
R&S Rating Services AG 
Standard & Poor’s  
SVEA Kredit-Information AB 
SVEFO Sverige AB 
Thomson Financial Bankwatch (Issuer) 
Thomson Financial Bankwatch (Long Term) 
Thomson Financial Bankwatch (Sovereign) 
Unternehmenstratingagentur AG (URA) 
Upplysningscentralen AB (UC AB) 
 
 
(Continued next page) 
 
 
Subscriber 
 
Subscriber 
 
Subscriber 
 
 
Subscriber 
Rated body 
Rated body 
 
Subscriber 
Subscriber 
Subscriber 
Rated body 
 
Rated body 
Rated body 
Subscriber 
Subscriber 
 
 
 
 
Subscriber 
 
 
 
 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
N 
Y 
N 
Y 
 
Y 
 
 
Y 
Y 
N 
N 
Y 
Y 
 
 
 
N 
Y 
 
 
 
 
MERGED AGENCIES 
Duff & Phelps Credit Rating Co. 
Fitch IBCA 
Fitch (2000) 
 
OUTSIDE G10 
Rating Agency Malaysia Berhad (RAM) 
Capital Intelligence 
 
 
Rated body 
Subscriber 
 
 
N 
Y 
 
 
N 
Y 
 
Notes 
 
1. With the exception of KMV and Lace Financial, the subscriber fee charged is for access to the rating of a single 
company (including own rating). 
 
Source:  Bank for International Settlements, Credit Ratings and Complementary Sources of  Credit Quality 
Information (Basel: BIS, 2000) 
